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Although more common in the Western United States,
inter- and intra-state water conflicts have reached the
more humid eastern part of the country. One such
current conflict involves the states of Georgia, Florida,
and Alabama in the so-called “Tri-State Water Wars.”

Mexico in northwest Florida. Its drainage area covers
19,800 square miles and is situated in three
physiographic regions of the Appalachian Highlands, the
Piedmont Plateau, and the Coastal Plain. Approximately
three-quarters of the basin is located in Georgia and
extends over 62 of its counties. The main rivers are the
Chattahoochee and Flint, which combine to form the
Apalachicola River after their confluence at Lake
Seminole.

The “water wars” relate to issues in two river basins: the
Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa (ACT) in the states of
Alabama and Georgia, and the ApalachicolaChattahoochee-Flint (ACF) in Alabama, Georgia, and
Florida. These basins both originate in north Georgia
and have a common boundary of approximately 233
miles. Both basins have experienced extensive water
resource development in the form of multiple purpose
reservoirs by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
and non-Federal interests. There are ten Corps operated
reservoirs and 21 privately owned reservoirs in the two
basins.

The population within the ACF is almost 2.7 million, 90
percent of which is located in Georgia’s portion of the
basin. The southern and extreme northern parts of the
basin are rural and predominately comprised of farmland,
forest, and wetlands. Georgia accounts for 82 percent of
the water withdrawals in the system. The basin has
experienced extensive water resource development by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as well as non-federal
interests, primarily on the Chattahoochee River in the
form of multiple purpose reservoirs. Although there are
five Corps reservoirs and nine non-federal reservoirs on
the Flint River, there exists little storage capacity on the
river. The ACF river system is used to supply water to
municipalities and industries, for hydroelectric and
thermoelectric power generation, for navigation, for
aquatic habitat, and for a variety of lake and river
recreation activities. The Buford reservoir at Lake Lanier
has the bulk of the storage capacity and is closest to the
headwaters of the Chattahoochee. This reservoir must be
operated conservatively, because its inflow to storage
ratio is the lowest in the system, and recovery after
drawdowns is lengthy. With the West Point, W. F.
George, and G. W. Andrews reservoirs downstream from
Lake Lanier, 80 percent of the management capacity is
concentrated in the northern part of the basin.

The water conflict in the southern United States began
due in large measure to the growth and needs of the
Atlanta metro area. The rapid pace of population growth
during the 1980s and into the 1990s, along with a series
of droughts, created a demand on the water resources of
the two basins. The issues involved are diverse and
complex, involving both surface and ground water, as
well as water quality, economic development issues, and
the interbasin transfer of water.
This paper will provide a brief background to the dispute
and a description of the methods used to negotiate two
interstate compacts between the three states. The paper
will also note the current status of the negotiations and
the outlook for success. Although the three states did
sign interstate compacts in 1997, they left open the
primary issue under dispute: an allocation formula for
water use. In December 1998 a one year extension to the
negotiations was agreed to by the states, setting a
December 31, 1999 deadline.

The ACT begins with two rivers: the Coosa and
Tallapoosa. Both of these rivers begin in northwest
Georgia and extend into Alabama, combining to form the
Alabama River, which flows into Mobile Bay.
Navigation and hydropower are important water users in
the ACT.

THE ACF-ACT RIVER BASINS
The ACF river basin stretches over 385 miles from
northeast Georgia to the Apalachicola Bay at the Gulf of
38

The U.S. Congress, aware of this regional disharmony,
provided funding in 1990 for the Corps to initiate a
comprehensive water resources study. This study
addressed the availability of water and anticipated longterm water needs, as well as the potential ramifications of
various water management options on multiple interests
in the two basins.

THE TRI-STATE WATER WAR
Over the last 30 years, a number of water resources
studies have been conducted by Federal and state agencies
in both the ACT and ACF river basins. Over time, the
issues considered in these studies became more
controversial such that in June 1983 the Governors of
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, together with the Corps
signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to develop
a water management system for the ACF basin. Also,
during the early 1980s (which included several drought
periods), the Corps received requests from several northGeorgia communities requesting reallocation of reservoir
storage to satisfy increasing water supply needs. After 16
years of study, the Corps prepared draft reports in 1989
proposing reallocation of storage in three reservoirs (Lake
Lanier, Lake Allatoona, and Carters Lake). The reports
suggested changing a portion of the water storage in Lake
Lanier from hydropower to water supply use. A
reallocation was also proposed for Lake Allatoona and the
Walter George Regional Reservoir.

On January 3, 1992, after 18 months of dialogues and
negotiations, the Governors and the Corps signed an
MOA committing them to work together as equal
partners through the Comprehensive Study process to
seek resolution of water resource issues. The provisions
of the MOA were:
1. The parties committed to a process for cooperative
management and development of regional water
resources.
2. The parties agreed to participate in the comprehensive
study as equal partners.

On June 28, 1990, the State of Alabama, concerned about
the downstream and cumulative impacts of proposed and
potential future water resource actions, filed litigation in
the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama (later jointed by Florida), challenging the
adequacy of the Corp’s environmental impact
documentation addressing the proposed reallocations and
the procedures that the Corps had followed in operating
Federal reservoirs.

3. The States committed to contribute direct and indirect
monetary resources to the study process.
4. The parties agreed to exert their best efforts to
complete the comprehensive study, or a substantial
part thereof, within three years.
5. The study report was to include:
a. A conceptual plan for water resource management
of all water resources including management of
Federal and non-Federal impoundments in both
basins.

Shortly after the litigation was filed by Alabama,
representatives of Alabama, Georgia, Florida, and the
Corps began discussions seeking to resolve the conflicts.
There was general agreement among the parties that
litigation was the least desirable option for resolving the
water resource conflicts. The State of Alabama requested
that the Court stay the litigation while negotiations were
pursued; the Court granted this request. A significant
breakthrough occurred when the three states agreed to
play a greater role as full partners with the Corps in a
comprehensive study process. The states, as evidence to
their commitment to the process, agreed to voluntarily
contribute funds to the study to supplement Federal
funding.

b. An assessment of the existing and future water
resource needs, including needs of human,
economic, natural, and other systems.
c. An assessment of the extent of water resources
available within each basin to service such needs.
d. An appropriate mechanism or mechanisms to
implement the findings or recommendations of the
comprehensive study.

As a result of the dialogue among the parties, a Letter of
Agreement (LOA) was signed by the Governors of the
States of Alabama and Georgia and the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Civil Works on April 29, 1991.
The LOA addressed certain short-term issues within the
ACT river basin, including a proposed regional west
Georgia reservoir.

6. A “live and let live” concept for water utilization
while the study is underway, including a notification
procedure for proposed new or increased withdrawals.
The Corps agreed to operate the Federal reservoirs in
the two basins to maximize the water resource benefits
of the basins as a whole.
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7. The parties committed to establish a system for
facilitating the resolution of any future disputes
regarding the comprehensive study. The system shall
include non-binding mediation for issues which
cannot be resolved through negotiations.

compacts would have been dissolved and the case
reinstated in Federal Court.

8. The Court would be petitioned to place the litigation
initiated by the State of Alabama against the Corps to
an inactive docket pending completion of the
comprehensive study (the Court granted this request).

When the dispute over the ACT/ACF began, it was clear
that there was little agreement regarding the uses of water
in the three states. There was also a wide disparity
between the states in their knowledge of water demands.
Consequently, it was difficult for the states to agree on
any baseline data for negotiations. The states agreed to
use a “Comprehensive Study” framework to both provide
the necessary baseline information needed for
negotiations, and to provide negotiators a way to resolve
conflicts as they occur.

COMPREHENSIVE STUDY AS A
NEGOTIATION TOOL

The three states and the Corps were equal partners in the
conduct of the study and were responsible for all technical
aspects and the overall management of the study process.
Although the study agreement was to expire on
September 30, 1996, the states agreed to extend the
deadline so that all of the research could be completed
and compacts adopted by the parties. The new agreement
allowed for completion by December 31, 1997.

The negotiations began with a five-day skill building and
decisionmaking workshop in September 1992. The
workshop included training to enhance participants’
abilities to approach negotiations from the standpoint of
being partners and joint problem solvers. This training
included:

A major outcome of the Comprehensive Study was the
development of two interstate compacts, one for each
river basin. The compacts were adopted in identical form
by the Georgia, Florida, and Alabama legislatures in
1997 and ratified by the U.S. Congress.

• Principles of teamwork, including building trust,
defining the team on an inclusive basis, the
consequence of negative or adversarial actions, and
steps for engaging others in cooperative rather than
competitive relationships;

The compacts established a formal and legal framework
for addressing water allocation issues, basin wide
management and dispute resolution. The compacts
established commissions comprised of the governors of
the states and a federal representative appointed by the
President. The commissions are to have broad powers to
plan, coordinate and monitor waters; to conduct studies;
to cooperate in the development of water resource
facilities; and most importantly, to establish and modify
an allocation formula for apportioning the water of the
basins among the states. Although the framework for
deciding on a water allocation is in place, all the issues
creating the conflict still exist.

• Attitudes, procedures, and principles of negotiation on
the basis of understanding all parties’ interests and
problem solving to meet those interests;
• Analysis of each state’s and the Corps’ interests
regarding water resources management and
allocations;
• Communication skills, including listening for
understanding, reframing toxic or positional
statements into statements of interests, framing of “I
messages,” and framing of issues or joint problems to
be jointly solved.

These compacts required determining equitable water
allocations for the two systems by December 31, 1998.
Basin Commissions would be responsible for the
development of allocation formulas “for equitably
apportioning the surface waters of the . . . Basin among
the states while protecting the water quality, ecology, and
biodiversity of the river systems” (House Joint Resolution
91, article VII, paragraph (a)). However, when the
December 31, 1998 deadline arrived, an agreement had
not yet been reached. The states agreed to an extension
of the negotiations that expired on December 31, 1999.
Had the states not agreed to another extension, the

The subsequent comprehensive study had four main
objectives:
Process Support Element;
Water Demand;
Water Resource Availability; and
Comprehensive Management Strategy.
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The water demand objective was to assess future demands
to the year 2050 including both in-stream and out-ofstream demands. Also to be included was environmental
quality and special needs such as fresh water demands in
the Apalachicola Bay. The availability of water resources
included the influence of drought and floods, and other
climatic factors.
Finally, both a comprehensive
management strategy and a coordination mechanism was
to be established. Fifteen study elements, ranging from
agricultural demands to navigation, were also part of the
study.

for evaluating alternatives; 5) vehicle for resolving
conflicts; and 6) framework for expanding the number of
people who understand system operation. It was believed
that time spent in the shared vision model development
process would facilitate acceptance of model results, as
technical issues had to be resolved prior to their
incorporation into the model. This allowed the study
partners to focus on understanding the results of the
models rather than debating the model’s assumptions
when results were produced.
A main purpose of using a comprehensive study approach
to water conflict resolution was to “turn on the lights” of
information for all parties concerned. The major
questions to be answered were: 1) what can the resources
of the two water basins provide, and 2) what management
options can best utilize, optimize, and protect those
resources? Only when all parties have equal information
and believe in the accuracy of that information, can an
equitable resolution to a water conflict occur.

A major element in the efforts to resolve the conflict has
been the use of “Shared Vision Models.” Shared vision
models are computer simulation models of water systems
that are built, reviewed, and tested collaboratively with
stakeholders through a shared vision process. The shared
vision process included both decisionmakers and key
stakeholders in the development of the models to more
accurately reflect the operational aspects of the system, as
well as to increase the probability of model acceptance.
The models were designed to represent not only the water
system infrastructure and operation, but also the
interrelationships between various water demands.
Shared vision models take advantage of new, userfriendly, graphical simulation software to bridge the gap
between specialized water models and the
decisionmaking processes.

The negotiations were conducted in two parallel but
distinct processes. One process was the negotiation of a
water allocation formula by the states. The other is an
Environmental Impact Statement on the anticipated
impacts of any allocation results. The states (with the aid
of a representative of the Federal agencies involved) were
charged with developing the allocation formula and the
Federal agencies were given the evaluation task.

The models were used to estimate the impacts to
stakeholders of changing basin management rules to
favor each of the major uses over all other demands. The
models helped each group understand how the water
system responds to these changes and to help formulate
alternatives. From over 50 suggestions made by
participants, each study partner defined a model output
that reflected their ideal situation.
Among the
alternatives examined were changes in the physical
structure of storage, delivery, return, or routing systems.
Also evaluated were the effects of new reservoirs, training
dikes, navigation projects, changes in reservoir operation
rules, ground water pumping rules, and navigation
dredging programs. Finally, demand modifications were
examined such as the effect of municipal and industrial,
agricultural, and energy conservation efforts.

As part of the process, there has been no effort to evaluate
the effectiveness of the shared vision modeling efforts or
its utility. However, model results have been used by all
participants to compare scenarios and examine various
reservoir operating procedures for the systems. Neither
has there been any effort to evaluate quantitative payoffs
for alternative allocation patterns to see if compensation
might be possible. First, the compacts passed in 1997
prohibit monetary compensation if an agreed upon
allocation formula’s requirements are not met. Any such
monetary awards would have to be addressed in court.
Second, from the beginning of the process, both Alabama
and Florida were reluctant to include economic issues in
the process. They have been concerned that if economic
issues are brought to the table, the interests of Georgia
and particularly the economic interests of Atlanta, would
far outweigh any economic impacts in Alabama and
Florida. Given that traditional benefit cost analysis is
usually heavily weighted to development projects and
often under-values environmental impacts, this position
is understandable.

The core of the shared vision modeling approach as
applied in the ACT-ACF study was to develop simulation
models of the two basins that could serve many purposes
including: 1) a repository for important data (hydrologic
information, demand data, supply data, etc.); 2)
characterization of the physical features of the basin; 3)
consistent statement of system operating policies; 4) tool
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It is during drought periods that the water demands
exceed the water supplies. Particularly, the issue rests on
flow conditions in the Flint River during droughts. The
Flint River basin is home to the major agricultural
production area in Georgia.
During droughts,
agricultural irrigation, upstream urban uses and flows to
Florida produce conflicting demands.

GROWTH, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND
CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS
When the Tri-State negotiations began, officials,
businesses, and farmers in Alabama were concerned with
the economic development effects of less water being
available in the two river basins of the ACT. While
current flows from Georgia to Alabama in the ACT basin
meet demands, the people of Alabama view the water as
a necessary resource for future growth in areas that have
experienced slow growth in recent years. From their
point of view, the water is theirs; it just happens to flow
through Georgia first. It is difficult for Alabama to
demonstrate a potential economic loss from the
reallocation of water requested by Atlanta. Yet, they are
concerned about the effect of water reallocation on their
future economic development. The Alabama media was
especially critical of Georgia’s increasing demands for
water with what was perceived as little concern for
downstream interest.

Florida is seeking from Georgia a specific agreement on
flows in the Flint River.
The Flint joins the
Chattahoochee at the Florida line in southwest Georgia to
form the Apalachicola which flows across the Florida
Panhandle into the Apalachicola Bay.
Florida has demanded a set of 48 minimum monthly
average flows delivered to the Apalachicola Bay. These
include a set of yearly minimum monthly average flows,
a five-year average monthly minimum flow, and sets of
ten and 25 year minimum flows. During the December
1999 negotiation periods, Florida and Georgia came close
to not extending the negotiations to May 1 on a
misunderstanding of this issue. Florida’s proposals for
the five, ten, and 25-year minimum monthly flows were
for a moving average, which was not clear to the Georgia
negotiators. Once clarified, the two states are close to
agreement on the multiyear averages.
Another
miscommunication also threatened the negotiations.
Georgia had agreed to operate Lake Lanier at an
elevation of 1,055 feet, but Florida thought the proposal
was for 1,067 feet. When the two states reran water
models they agreed on the 1,055 foot level.

The Florida part of this conflict is substantially different
and presents a more complex problem. Florida officials,
businesses, and fishing interests are concerned about the
environmental impact that the reallocation of water may
have on oyster and other fisheries in the Apalachicola
basin in Florida.
The State of Florida became
increasingly concerned with potential impacts to the
Apalachicola River and Bay, a National Estuarine
Reserve and valuable seafood producer. Here, issues
affected by the Coastal Zone Management Act are
producing complex environmental concerns. Water in
the Flint and Chattahoochee rivers flows into Lake
Seminole and is released into the Apalachicola Bay. A
reduction in this flow could increase salinity in the oyster
beds in the Bay, as well as reduce the nutrients in fishing
areas.

Regarding the yearly minimum average flow, Georgia has
notified Florida that they cannot meet the minimum flows
demanded. Florida has asked for a guaranteed delivery of
water in the Flint River at Bainbridge, Georgia, of 1300
cubic feet per second. Basically, the states disagree on
what is happening on the Flint River. The states have
differing visions of how current agricultural irrigation
from aquifers affect surface water flows in dry years. The
issue has developed into one of state sovereignty. The
State of Georgia’s position is that the Flint River is solely
a Georgia river and Florida should not tell Georgia how
to manage water within its boundaries. As stated by
Georgia’s chief negotiator, “ . . . Georgia will not allow
its economic growth to be compromised by
unsubstantiated demands from Florida.” There are also
differences in the two states’ concepts of reservoir
operations and in the interim drought management plans.

As the December 31, 1999, deadline approached, it was
clear that no agreements were going to be reached in time
to fulfill the 60-day public comment requirement of the
compacts. The question in December 1999 was whether
to extend the deadline again to keep negotiations alive or
to let the dispute return to the jurisdiction of the Federal
courts and eventually to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Although still far apart in their positions, the three states
agreed to an extension to May 1, 2000. Alabama
negotiators are seeking assurances that the amount of
water Georgia would be required to send to Alabama
would be the minimum and not the norm. One solution
on the table is the construction of more reservoirs in
Georgia.

FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS?
After nearly ten years of discussion and seven years of
study and information sharing as noted above, the TriState Water Wars may still be headed to Federal Court.
When the three states agreed to the Comprehensive Study

During normal rainfall years, there is enough water in the
river basins to meet all demands through the year 2050.
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format for resolving the conflict, none of them anticipated
a multimillion dollar ten-year adventure. Water resource
development in all three states has been slowed (and in
some cases halted) during this process. None of the states
expected the negotiation process to last longer and be
more expensive than going to court in the early 1990s.
Had Georgia officials foreseen this process, the original
law suit very possibly would have been preserved.

Florida should not increase their fish harvests, which
could produce a higher demand for water. At a meeting
on December 29, 1999, an agreement on the May 1, 2000
extension was reached. As the May 1 deadline
approached, another extension to August 1 was necessary.
As part of the most recent extension, the states agreed to
consider the use of a mediator to assist future
negotiations. While this was a relatively minor point at
the time, the use of a mediator has now become a point of
contention. There have been no public meetings or
negotiations on water issues since the extension. The
time since May 1 has been spent trying to decide the role
and powers of a mediator, how one is to be selected, and
who might act in such a role. It appears no negotiations
on substantive issues has taken place. Consequently, if
the mediator question is resolved, a new deadline beyond
August 1 will be required. In a recent article in a
Montgomery, Alabama newspaper, the Alabama
negotiator noted they are tired of waiting and may go
back to court. The Alabama governor’s office later
backed off that statement.

If negotiations fail and the compacts are dissolved, what’s
next? It appears that the State of Georgia will formally
withdraw the original reallocation request to the Corps,
making the law suit in northern Alabama moot. Georgia
can then file a new request and bring suit themselves in
a Georgia Federal Court. In any case, the prospect of a
lengthy and costly legal battle still faces the states. What
they feared ten years ago may yet happen.
The major obstacle to successful negotiations is not
necessarily how much water was to be allocated across
the three states, but how the allocation during drought
periods was to occur. While Alabama and Georgia may
still settle their dispute, Florida and Georgia may be
locked in a dispute that has to do more with state powers
than water allocation.

In essence, even with a multiyear comprehensive study of
the water demands in the two basins, the negotiators
arrived at the same position they began – all are seeking
the most water possible, and all are avoiding real
compromise. With water use tied up in issues of
economic growth, all sides to the negotiation have found
reaching a solution difficult.

On December 14, 1999, in an effort to save the
negotiations, Georgia altered its proposal to try and keep
Florida at the table. Georgia had proposed a guaranteed
minimum flow to Florida during droughts for a 50 year
period. Georgia suggested a modification that would
allow negotiated changes in the flow regime after only ten
years. Georgia also called for further studies of minimum
flow levels along the Flint and Chattahoochee Rivers. At
the same time, Georgia asked for limits on oyster and
other fish catches taken from the Apalachicola Bay.
Georgia negotiators felt that during the interim period,
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